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MESOAMERICAN CONQUISTADORS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

MICHEL R. OUDIJK AND MATTHEW RESTALL

Y en esto que escribe es por sublimar a Cortés y abatir a nosotros los que con él pasamos, y sepan que hemos tenido por cierto los conquistadores verdaderos que esto vemos escrito, . . . porque en todas las batallas o reencuentros éramos los que sosteníamos a Cortés, y ahora nos aniquila en lo que dice este coronista.

[And it seems to me now that he [Francisco López de Gómara] wrote this in order to raise up [Hernando] Cortés and knock down those of us who were with him, seeing as we have been taken as surely being the true conquistadors, . . . for in all the battles it was us who sustained Cortés, and now he obliterates us in what he writes this chronicler.]

BERNAL DÍAZ DEL CASTILLO, *HISTORIA VERDADERA DE LA
CONQUISTA DE LA NUEVA ESPAÑA*

In the seventh painting of the Kislak Conquest of Mexico series, created around the 1680s, the fall of Tenochtitlan is depicted as an epic battle between Spanish troops and Mexica defenders (see fig. 1.1). Titled *Conquista de México por Cortés*, the image promotes the roles of the Spanish leader and his principal captains (three of whom are named in the key),

emphasizes the military prowess of the conquerors, eclipses the presence of black soldiers completely, and marginalizes the part played by the Tlaxcalteca and other native allies of the invaders. The Tlaxcalteca are not omitted altogether from the picture, but they are shown as merely bringing up the rearguard (dressed in white, on the causeways at the top or in the background of the painting), arriving behind the Spaniards, when most, if not all, the fighting had been done (Pedro de Alvarado has already "raised His Majesty's flag" atop "the pyramid of Guichilobos").¹

The Kislak series most immediately reflects (and may have been directly influenced by) the interpretations and emphases of the *Historia de la conquista de México* published by Antonio de Solís y Rivadeneira in 1684. Solís's account, however, drew upon earlier narratives, and in a larger sense both the Solís text and the Kislak images represent a perspective on the conquests of Mexico and Peru that was rooted in the accounts of the Spanish invaders themselves, reinforced during the centuries of colonial rule, reified by William Prescott's nineteenth-century epics (still in print), and perpetuated in various ways through the twentieth century. This perspective tends to begin by posing the question, How were such amazing feats possible?

The question has been repeated by chroniclers and historians from the early sixteenth century to the present.² It has functioned well as an irresistible hook that pulls the reader into the story while at the same time setting up that story as an elaborate answer or explanation for the conquest. That explanation (with respect primarily to central Mexico but to some extent to Mesoamerica) has variously stressed the genius of Hernando Cortés, the superiority of Spanish military resources, the providential intervention of God, the political and moral decadence of the Mexica empire at the time of the invasion, the structural weakness of that empire and the disunity of Mesoamerican peoples, the impact of epidemic disease, and the failings of Moctezuma and his alleged belief that Cortés was the returning deity of Quetzalcoatl. Not surprisingly, in the twentieth century religious explanations (the conquest as miracle) faded in popularity in favor of more secular ones (relative military technologies), while an emphasis on "great men" was largely replaced by one on structures and patterns. For example, in the recent *Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest*, Matthew Restall argues that Spanish conquests in the Americas can mostly be explained by a combination of three factors working together—epidemic disease, native disunity or micropatriotism, and metal weapons (but not necessarily guns and horses).³

FIGURE 1.1.

Conquista de México por Cortés, painting 7 in the Kislak Conquest of Mexico series, ca. 1680s. Reproduced courtesy of the Jay I. Kislak Collection, Rare Book and Special Collections, Library of Congress, Washington DC.



The traditional conquistador-based view of the conquest is not as entrenched as it once was. On the one hand, *Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest* presented these “myths” (meaning misconceptions and well-entrenched erroneous perceptions) as so deeply rooted as to persist in some form or another to this day. On the other hand, that book was also made possible by increasing numbers of revisionist voices and presentations of myth-debunking evidence—a development notably reflected in the present volume. Indeed, the aspect of the revisionist view of the conquest that has arguably become most widely known and accepted is the existence of native allies.⁴ The most obvious example is the undisputed fact that Tlaxcala provided large numbers of warriors to assist the Spaniards in their siege and destruction of Tenochtitlan; in fact, this is no longer a revisionist observation at all, as no historian today would argue that the marginalization of Tlaxcalteca in the Kislak paintings accurately reflects their role in the destruction of the Mexica empire. However, what is far less well known is the full extent and nature of native support and influence during the

decades of Spanish military activity in Mesoamerica, beginning in 1519 and stretching through the sixteenth century.

In this chapter, we will discuss native roles in four categories, moving from the better known toward a more novel suggestion regarding conquest patterns and possibilities. These four categories are, first, the numbers of native auxiliaries; second, the ubiquity of native allies beyond the best-known examples from the Spanish-Mexica war of 1519–21; third, the crucial role of noncombatant auxiliaries, such as guides, spies, interpreters, porters, cooks, and so on; and fourth, the possibility that the Spanish conquest imitated preconquest patterns of imperial expansion in Mesoamerica, so that it became modeled to some extent on the conquests that created the Mexica empire. Our sources are a combination of secondary sources and primary archival ones, mostly petitions sent to Spain by sixteenth-century Mesoamerican conquistadors.

A GREAT QUANTITY OF INDIAN FRIENDS

E vio que al tiempo que vinieron a ayudar a la conquista della mucha cantidad de yndios amigos naturales de taxcala e mexicanos y naturales de chulula e çapotecas e mistecas e yopes e de guacachula todos amigos de los españoles los quales despues de venidos a esta tierra bio este testigo que en seruiçio de dios nuestro señor y de su mag[estad] se hallaron en todas las vatallas e rrecuentros . . . y seruieron muy bien con sus personas e armas padesçiendo mucho cansançio e hambres e nesçeçidades y muchas heridas muchos años hasta que se conquisto e paçifico la tierra y se puso so el dominio de su mag[estad].
 [And he saw that at that time there came to help in the conquest a great quantity of Indian friends, natives of Tlaxcala, and Mexicans and natives of Cholula and Zapoteca and Mixteca and Yope and from Cuauhquecholan, all friends of the Spaniards, who after coming to this land—this witness saw—in the service of God our Lord and of Your Majesty, were at all the battles and encounters . . . and served very well with their persons and their arms, suffering much exhaustion and hunger and deprivation and many wounds over many years until the land was conquered and pacified and placed under the dominion of Your Majesty.

In styling the Spanish-Mexica war as "The Conquest of Mexico" or "The Spanish Conquest," albeit one made possible by native "allies" or with native "assistance," one runs the risk of recasting the war with native allies still in a supporting role. Such language cannot be avoided altogether. Nor should the role of the Spaniards as initiators and ultimate beneficiaries of the war be forgotten. Yet a highlighting of the demographic balance within allied forces—the sheer numbers of native warriors fighting against the Mexica in 1519–21 and against other polities in subsequent years—helps to illuminate the important ways in which the nominal subordination of native forces to Spanish leadership was tempered by the utter dependence of Spaniards on the native warriors who consistently outnumbered them.

Even before the Spanish-Mexica war had begun, when the invaders were still in the Cempoala region, Cortés and his company were outnumbered five to one by an allied native force of two thousand soldiers. From this point on, the ratio became more and more profound, as rulers of towns through which the Spanish-native caravan—whom we shall call "the allies"—would pass donated soldiers to take part in the campaign. The calculation of numbers is admittedly an imprecise science, as total numbers are seldom given, and Spanish accounts often omit mention of native allies. For example, in his first letter to Cortés during his campaign in Guatemala, Pedro de Alvarado makes no mention of the Mexica, Tlaxcalteca, and other natives accompanying him. Yet we know from many other sources that they existed, and in his second letter Alvarado lets slip, in parentheses, that his forces comprised 250 Spaniards "and about five or six thousand friendly Indians."⁵

Calculations of numbers are also complicated by the fact that armies are often described in terms of captains. Thus Cempoala gave forty captains, while Xalacingo gave twenty. Evidence from Alvarado's Guatemala campaign suggests that these captains were in charge of units that the Spaniards termed *cuadrillas*, squadrons that consisted of people from the community (or *barrio* within a town) of origin of each particular captain.⁶ Such *cuadrillas* consisted of either two hundred or four hundred soldiers, which means that calculations of total warriors can be off by a factor of two.⁷ Nevertheless, even if we take the lower figure of two hundred to a *cuadrilla*, Cempoala's contribution to the allies was an impressive eight thousand men. Furthermore, these numbers were dwarfed by Tlaxcala's contribution, once that city entered the new alliance. According to Bernal

Díaz del Castillo, Xicotencatl, the principal ruler of Tlaxcala, insisted that ten thousand soldiers should accompany the Spaniards to Cholula. Later, during the siege of Tenochtitlan, the number of Spaniards had grown to some five hundred men, while at least twenty-four thousand indigenous allies took part. These numbers could have been higher still; there are references to as many as forty thousand indigenous soldiers taking part in a campaign to Iztapalapa.⁸

Armies of "Indian friends" were less likely to number in the tens of thousands after 1521, due to the death toll of the Spanish-Mexica war and the impact of waves of epidemic disease beginning in 1520. But it was still common for Spaniards embarking on campaigns throughout Mesoamerica to be accompanied by thousands of Nahua from central Mexico and other native warriors. As the next section briefly discusses (and subsequent chapters in this volume demonstrate in detail), this was true for decades—through the founding of a Spanish colony in Yucatan in the early 1540s.

IN EVERY ONE OF THESE PROVINCES AND CITIES

E despues de conquistada e ganada esta tierra los d[ic]hos yndios conquistadores de la nueva españa muchos dellos se quedaron poblados en la çiudad bieja de almolonga ques çerca de guatimala donde agora estan y biven ellos e sus hijos y descendientes y asimismo este testigo sabe e bio que muchos españoles capitanes salieron desta çiudad de guatimala con mucha gente a conquistar e poblar las provinçias de cuzcatlan que agora se llama entre españoles san salvador e la provinçia de honduras e la provinçia de la verapaz e la de chiapa con los quales d[ic]hos capitanes este testigo vio que ffueron muchos yndios de los d[ic]hos conquistadores mexicanos y taxcaltecas e çapotecas e chulutecas e mistecas e otras naçiones.

[And these Indian conquistadors of New Spain, having conquered and won this land, stayed in large numbers to settle the old city of Almolonga, which is near to Guatemala [Antigua]; where they and their children and descendents now are and live and . . . many Spanish captains went out from this city of Guatemala with many people to conquer and settle the provinces of Cuzcatlan, which the Spaniards now call San Salvador, and the province of Honduras and the province of Verapaz and that of Chiapa; and this witness saw that with those captains went many Indians from among those Mexica, Tlaxcalteca,

Zapoteca, Cholulteca, and Mixteca conquistadors, and those of other nations.]

GONZALO ORTÍZ, 1564

The high numbers cited in some sources on the Spanish-Mexica war of 1519–21 also crop up regularly in the many indigenous requests and claims that were sent to the Audiencia Real and to the emperor during the sixteenth century—petitions relating in part to 1519–21 but primarily to the decades of conquest wars that followed the fall of Tenochtitlan. All Spaniards participating in the process of exploration, discovery, conquest, and colonization in the Americas were required to submit reports to royal officials—addressed directly to the king—detailing what they had found and done. These reports sometimes took the form of *cartas* (letters), *relaciones* (accounts), or other related genres, but most commonly they conformed to the genre of the *probanza de mérito* (proof of merit). The rewarding of titles of office and other benefits of conquest was contingent upon the submission of these reports, but they were also the principal means whereby any participant in any Spanish conquest might acquire (or have restored) official reward, privilege, or benefit. Thus while most *probanzas* were submitted by Spaniards and requested the granting of pensions, *encomiendas*, and offices of colonial rule, black conquistadors also petitioned for such rewards as royal pensions, tribute exemption, and the right to a house-plot in the *traza*, or central zone, of a colonial city.⁹

Likewise, native elites or entire native communities (represented by their municipal councils or *cabildos*) also submitted petitions, whose style and form tended to be a hybrid blend of the Spanish *probanza* and the Mesoamerican petition.¹⁰ In particular during the second half of the sixteenth century, various indigenous groups sent letters claiming rights and privileges based on their participation in the conquest. In addition to styling themselves as conquistadors, these native petitioners often cited the numbers of people that were involved in conquest campaigns.¹¹ Although such numbers may have been exaggerated for obvious reasons, when compared to the numbers given in Spanish sources they give us a good sense of how many indigenous troops actually took part in certain campaigns. A document from Xochimilco, for example, claims that twelve thousand Xochimilca took part in the siege of Tenochtitlan and that another twenty-five hundred accompanied Pedro de Alvarado to Guatemala and Honduras.

A 1547 letter from Tlaxcala refers to a thousand men going on this same Guatemalan campaign, but in a 1567 letter a number of twenty thousand Tlaxcalteca is given for all the soldiers provided by Tlaxcala for Spanish conquests throughout Mesoamerica. Don Juan Cortés, the indigenous ruler of Tehuantepec, supposedly sent two thousand men with Pedro de Alvarado for the conquest of Chiapas and Guatemala, while Pedro Gonzalez Nájera, a Spanish resident of Guatemala City and conquistador of the region, claims that seven thousand indigenous allies took part in the conquests. Finally, Jorge de Alvarado brought some five to six thousand native auxiliaries to Guatemala in 1527.¹²

Mesoamerican conquistadors spoke of the sufferings of war as much as their Spanish counterparts did, and the casualties of some of these campaigns seem to support assertions that victories often came at heavy native costs. On one expedition to San Salvador, for example, a campaign lasting about one hundred days, 300 indigenous soldiers left, but only 140 came back. Other testimonies of the campaigns to southern Mesoamerica are vague as to the number of people that died, but all agree that many did. On some expeditions, survivors settled as colonists; for example, in a letter to the king the authorities of Xochimilco claim that more than 1,100 warriors left on campaigns to Panuco, Guatemala, Honduras, and Jalisco, but not a single one of these men came back.¹³

There is some evidence that the indigenous contribution went much further than cooperation and alliance. In 1584 Don Joachin de San Francisco, *cacique* of Tepexi de la Seda in present-day Puebla, demanded to be exempted from paying tribute due to the merits and services of his grandfather, Don Gonzalo Matzatzin Moctezuma.¹⁴ In an astonishing testimony, backed-up by the statement of some thirty witnesses, Don Joachin claimed that when Hernando Cortés was in Tlaxcala his grandfather had sent ambassadors with rich gifts in order to vow loyalty to the new emperor. Such a ceremony was repeated much later (after the so-called Noche Triste) when Cortés and his troops had conquered Tepeaca (from where Cortés had come to Tepexi). On this occasion Matzatzin received a lance and sword, and he agreed to conquer the “province of the Mixteca and Oaxaca” for which he received in the name of the king of Spain the title of captain. While Cortés returned to the north on his way to reconquer and punish Tenochtitlan for its uprising, Matzatzin turned south and—before the Mexica capital itself had finally fallen—conquered as many as twenty towns in the Mixteca Baja and Alta.

It is tempting to dismiss this document as fraudulent in its claims, at least in the alleged timing of these conquests if not the very role played by warriors from Tepexi. This would hardly be the only colonial Mesoamerican source to exaggerate or invent native roles in the conquest.¹⁵ Furthermore, neither Cortés, Díaz del Castillo, nor any other chronicler refers to the Tepexi alliance or to Matzatzin's conquests. However, a strong argument can be made for the veracity of Don Gonzalo's version of events. The pictorial Lienzo de Tlaxcala shows the same sequence of events as described by Don Joachin and his witnesses: the Noche Triste, the arrival in Tlaxcala, the conquests of various towns in southern Puebla (including Tepexi), and the conquest of Tenochtitlan.¹⁶ Furthermore, Cortés (and to a lesser extent, Díaz del Castillo) had much to gain from not mentioning the Tepexi alliance. First, in his letters to the king, Cortés wanted to show that he alone had directed the conquest, despite the opposition of formidable forces. Second, and probably more important, when he received Cortés and his men, Matzatzin gave rich presents of gold, silver, and precious stones to show his friendship and loyalty. If Cortés or Díaz del Castillo had mentioned these, the king would have demanded his share—the royal fifth. Of course, many gifts were reported and much was remitted to Spain, but enough was held back in order to make the enterprise more profitable. Furthermore, testimonies by the witnesses, many of whom were from the conquered towns, lend considerable credibility to the Tepexi document. In addition, on July 8, 1588, Don Joachin received the *merced* (grant) that exempted him from paying tribute.¹⁷ Of course, six of the conquered towns are also known to have been part of tributary provinces of the Triple Alliance that underpinned the Mexica empire.¹⁸ However, this still leaves fourteen towns that could have been conquered by Matzatzin. This may explain the manner in which these conquests took place. According to several witnesses, some towns were subdued through “lagoons of good words,” while others were subdued through war.¹⁹ If some of these towns were already subject to the Triple Alliance (whose emperor was a relative of Matzatzin), they may have been more willing to accept these new “conquests.”

Finally, a further dimension of the use of native allies by Spaniards in Mesoamerica—and one that has received little scholarly attention—is the taking of native warriors on Spanish campaigns outside Mesoamerica. As one Spanish conquest tended to act as a springboard for another, and Spaniards discovered Peru a decade after they found Mesoamerica, it is not surprising that a number of Mesoamerican warriors ended up fight-

ing in the Andes. Such soldiers did not participate in the initial Pizarro-Almagro invasion of Peru, as that was launched from Panama (with native men and women brought from no further north than Nicaragua). But Pedro de Alvarado brought Nahua and Maya, in addition to Nicaraguan natives, into the northern Andes in 1534. According to Pedro de Cieza de León, many of these native warriors and servants “died either because of the sea or from the great hardship they suffered on land.” Evidently some fought against Andeans, as the chronicler-conquistador also claims that Alvarado himself “reported to me that the Indians whom they had brought from Guatemala ate countless native people of these villages . . . and afterwards most of them froze in the cold and starved to death.” Cieza de León suggests that these ignominious deaths—Andeans eaten by Maya, Maya freezing in the high Andean mountain passes—are divine retribution for “their detestable sins.” Local Andeans, he alleges, practiced sodomy, and Guatemalan natives were cannibals—“sins so enormous that they deserved to suffer what they suffered; indeed, God permitted it.”²⁰

The Maya brought by Alvarado to the Andes were surely not the only Mesoamericans to die on Spanish ships in the Pacific Ocean. A 1624 request for a pension by a Spanish veteran of the wars of conquest in the Philippines claimed that in a 1603 campaign against “bloodthirsty Chinese [*chinos*]” (meaning Philippine natives), the Spanish force included “some Japanese and Indians.” That these “Indians” may have been Mesoamericans is strongly suggested by a petition, preserved in the same volume in the imperial archives in Seville, from the cabildo of Tlaxcala. Addressed to the king in 1630, the petition complained that the city had received many grievances from the officers (*gente de guerra*) that were sent to the Philippines and Havana or that were used for the defense of New Spain.²¹ Significantly, the cabildo’s gripe was with the conduct of Spanish officers and the abuse suffered by native soldiers, but the town councilors did not protest the practice of recruiting Tlaxcalteca men to serve the empire abroad, even as far away as the other side of the Pacific Ocean. A century after the Spanish-Mexica war, it had long become an accepted fact of life that Mesoamerican soldiers fought near and far in the service of His Majesty. It has recently become increasingly clear to historians that black and free colored soldiers were a ubiquitous presence on Spanish campaigns of conquest and networks of colonial defense; what should not be forgotten is the fact that native Mesoamericans also played significant roles that were almost as wide-ranging, both geographically and chronologically.²²

TREPIDATION IN THEIR HEARTS AND BAGS ON THEIR BACKS

Mexicalcinco (who afterwards took the name of Cristóbal) revealed to Cortés the conspiracy of Cuauhtémoc, and showed him a paper with the glyphs and names of the lords who were plotting his death. Cortés praised Mexicalcinco and promised him great rewards.

FRANCISCO LÓPEZ DE GÓMARA, CORTÉS

Çelutapech was killed by the Cehach men. . . . For this reason, the Castilian men went on with trepidation in their hearts, but as they killed five or six of the [Cehach] soldiers upon arriving in Cehach, it was Cehach men who cleared the way through to Tayasal [Ta Ytza].

TITLE OF ACALAN-TIXCHEL, 1604

On the European side of the Atlantic, Spanish and other continental soldiers were increasingly part of complex, large, and (sometimes well-) organized armies dependent on a vast supply and support network. However, these changes, which were part of what historians have dubbed the Military Revolution, were of little relevance to sixteenth-century Spanish conquests in the Americas (although they contributed to subsequent mythology about the conquest). Spanish invaders in Mesoamerica were not soldiers in a formally structured army but armed members of companies of exploration, conquest, and—if successful—settlement.²³ These men hoped that military activities would give way as soon as possible to the business of settlement, permitting Spanish merchants to follow conquistadors into a foundling colony, bringing with them supplies, slaves, correspondence, and perhaps, in time, family members. Meanwhile, would-be Spanish settlers were dependent on native networks of supply and support. Warriors were thus not the only natives who contributed to allied forces in Mesoamerica; there were also porters, cooks, guides, spies, and interpreters, who often played roles as crucial to Spanish survival as those played by armed native allies.

Large numbers of porters (or *tameme*, as Nahuatl speakers called them) were of the utmost importance for the success of any military undertaking in Mesoamerica. After all, beasts of burden were unknown in Mesoamerica, and Spaniards brought with them relatively few horses in

the early years of the conquest, so that without these tameme the conquistadors had to carry everything themselves. After the ruler of Cempoala had provided the Spaniards with four hundred tameme, Díaz del Castillo almost sighed with relief: "when we saw so many Indian porters we were very pleased, because before we always had to take our bags on our own backs."²⁴ Díaz del Castillo makes it clear that from then on they always demanded tameme, although the demand was unnecessary since it was a preconquest obligation for a ruler to provide allied lords with carriers. The sources on campaigns throughout Mesoamerica give many references to the tameme given to conquistadors; even a low-ranking Spanish conqueror who could not afford a horse had two indigenous porters. Indeed, one of the main complaints of the *conquistadores amigos* in the second half of the sixteenth century was precisely that their communities had provided large numbers of tameme carrying supplies, arms, and food for the Spaniards, without adequate recognition or reward. This same complaint is depicted in the painted *lienzos* from Analco and Quauhquechollan.²⁵ Of course, not only natives officially designated as tameme would have served as carriers. On various occasions indigenous conquistadors would have had to carry wounded Spaniards from the battlefield to safe havens, and, at times, when tameme were relatively few in number, warriors would have carried the sick and wounded during the march.²⁶

The importance of food supply is obvious, yet the native role is often ignored or understated. From the very onset of the Spanish invasion of Mesoamerica, every time Spaniards stepped foot on shore they needed to gather or acquire food. The problem during this early stage of the invasion was that many of the villages they encountered along the coast were either abandoned or openly hostile. On the island of Cozumel, Pedro de Alvarado simply took food from a village that had just been abandoned; he was allegedly reprimanded for this by Cortés and shortly after made an agreement with the local rulers to provide his men with the necessary resources. Díaz del Castillo often mentions the food that was provided by local rulers as well as the times they were without food.²⁷ From the moment the Spaniards reached Cempoala, where the local ruler invited them to stay and where they began the march toward Tenochtitlan, food was given by native amigos. References to this fundamental service are also common in other documents that concern Spanish-indigenous relations.²⁸

One of the most important Yucatec Maya sources on the conquest, the primordial *título*, or Title of Calkini, features a detailed description of a ritual

presentation of a large quantity of food by Calkini's rulers to a combined Spanish-Nahua invasion force. The event became an important part of the local memory of the conquest, and it must have made considerable impact on the hungry invaders too; the Maya text describes how the Nahua rushed to collect the "turkeys, corn, and honey . . . grabbing it all," with their captain admonishing them for not being more orderly.²⁹ In cases such as this, local rulers provided food from their own territories and consequently experienced problems feeding the conquistadors and their allies once they had moved outside of them. This situation was worsened by the tactics of the opposing side, who would hide food and other resources before hiding themselves in the mountains, leaving behind empty villages and barren lands.³⁰ Thus, in Guatemala, indigenous auxiliaries from central Mexico and Oaxaca "often suffered the travails of hunger."³¹ During the Cortés-led expedition to Honduras in 1525–26, the strain that was placed on the resources of the Chontal Maya kingdom of Acalan-Tixchel was so great that in the middle of the expedition's sojourn there, a combined Spanish-Maya force went off for several days to plunder neighboring polities for food and slaves—some of whom became part of the allied expedition's porter corps.³²

Another important aspect of indigenous participation in the conquest is the role of native guides, spies, and messengers, upon whom the Spaniards were almost completely dependent whenever entering territory that was unexplored or poorly known to them. En route to Tenochtitlan native guides warned the invaders on various occasions that there were large armies awaiting them on the road ahead. During subsequent campaigns to Guatemala and Honduras these guides would "go always in front discovering land and, if it would not have been for them, [the Spaniards] would have perished many times because the enemy Indians had placed ambushes for them and many pits from which one who fell in could not escape."³³ The path ahead often needed to be cleared or widened so that the expedition could pass, forcing guides to double up as laborers. This was particularly the case in southern Mesoamerica; sources often mention that the indigenous allies had to "open up the road," for the terrain was not only rough but post-1521 Spanish expeditions were often vast, with hundreds of Spaniards and Africans and thousands of native warriors and porters.

Guiding and clearing roads was certainly not a job without its risks, for any Mesoamerican on the allied side who was taken prisoner was likely to be ritually executed or sacrificed, as indigenous conquistadors make clear in their testimonies.³⁴ The Cortés-led crossing of northern Guatemala

in 1525 offers an example of how Spaniards used local men to traverse unknown and hostile territory. In order to get from Acalan-Tixchel to the next large Maya kingdom, that of the Itza, the expedition had to cross rivers and forests, as well as the smaller Cehach Maya kingdom. To accomplish this, they used large numbers of Chontal Maya to build a bridge, which took four days, and "to clear the way as far as Cehach." One of the Maya captains in charge of this operation, Çelutapech, was killed by Cehach warriors in an attack that unnerved the Spaniards. But once some Cehach Maya had been killed, the allied expedition was able to coerce the Cehach to then clear the way to the Itza capital (see the quote at the opening of this section); the Cehach motive for speeding the expedition through their territory is obvious.³⁵

As a group, messengers were also frequently referred to in conquest sources, and they too seemed to have feared for their lives while working for allied expeditions, at least according to Díaz del Castillo.³⁶ Moctezuma Xocoyotl had a system of messengers working throughout the region under his control and maybe beyond. As soon as the Spaniards set foot on shore, reports were sent to the Mexica ruler. This well-established system was soon appropriated by the Spaniards as a means of communicating both with enemy groups and among the conquistadors and allies themselves. This flow of information was crucial during the conquest period. Conquistadors often mention messages being continuously sent, although they seldom give much indication of exactly how this system worked. From one Spaniard, Gonzalo de Carvajal, we know that the system of native messengers covered much of Mesoamerica; he mentions, for example, that every month messengers came from Mexico City to the province of Yucatan.³⁷

A final group of noncombatant Mesoamericans who aided the Spaniards in crucial ways have been given more attention in conquest accounts than porters and spies—going all the way back to Díaz del Castillo—but in a somewhat distorted way. These are interpreters who have come to be symbolized by Doña Marina, or Malinche, whose history and historiography are lengthy and complex. Malinche has become legendary in a way that reveals more about postconquest (especially postcolonial) Mexican history than it does about the role of interpreters in the conquest. The important point here is that there were many native interpreters during the sixteenth century, and in the century's early decades most of them seem to have taken on the task with considerable reluctance. There would later be a generation of bilingual, even bicultural, Mesoamerican elites who would act as

formal interpreters and cultural brokers (like Gaspar Antonio Chi), but in the interim, in the words of Frances Karttunen, "for individuals pressed into service, the requirements of survival were flexibility, youth, sharp intellect, and sheer good luck." Like spying and carrying messages, interpreting was risky business.³⁸

Among the sources quoted earlier, there are Spaniards described as suffering trepidation and heavy burdens along the road; yet it is clear from the full array of sources that during the conquest it was primarily Mesoamericans, coerced or obliged in some way or another, who carried bags, cleared roads, took messages, and provided and cooked food.

PRECEDENTED EXPANSION

Cities were often attacked sequentially, with the resources, intelligence, and, sometimes, the soldiers of the latest conquest aided in the next one. . . . The Aztecs' unprecedented expansion took them to regions where they had no traditional enemies but where they were sometimes able to exploit local antagonisms by siding opportunistically with one adversary against another. They also waged campaigns of intimidation against cities they did not attack directly. Emmissaries went to such cities to ask that they become subjects of the Aztec king—usually on reasonably favorable terms. Both the proximity of a large, trained, and obviously successful army and the object lessons burning around them led many cities to capitulate peacefully.

ROSS HASSIG, AZTEC WARFARE

The strategies of expansion and mechanisms of conquest employed by Spaniards in sixteenth-century Mesoamerica have traditionally been explained in terms of the genius of Cortés and the precedents he set (as discussed earlier). More recently, historians have emphasized patterns of conquest rooted in the Castilian experience in Spain, the Canaries, and the Caribbean in the decades, even centuries, before the invasion of Mexico. Restall recently argued that these patterns amounted to a series of standard conquest procedures followed by Spanish conquistadors before and after Cortés and well evidenced throughout the Americas. None of these procedures was, according to this argument, rooted specifically in pre-conquest indigenous procedures or patterns of conquest.³⁹ However, our

suggestion here is that the history of Spanish conquests in Mesoamerica is marked by strategies and mechanisms that imitated those used in pre-conquest Mesoamerica—an imitation stemming from and symptomizing the extensive role played by native allies in these conquests. Specific strategies included the forging of multicity alliances, the pursuit of sequential conquests, the heavy use of trade routes, and the granting of lordships and lands as a way of coercing or motivating native communities into joining alliances.

This interpretation is not without problems. One could argue that these strategies were used equally in western European traditions of warfare and alliance building. Yet the question is less, What was customary in Europe at the time? but more, What did the indigenous population accept? Based on their experience and traditions the Spaniards hoped to implement many things as soon as they reached Mesoamerican soil, but they were not likely to succeed if the local populations were not willing to cooperate—at least in the initial conquest years when the Spaniards did not have the same means of colonial coercion developed later. Furthermore, in the larger colonial context, the entire framework of Spanish settlement and economic exploitation in the Americas was based on responses to Native American resources—as illustrated by what James Lockhart has called the “trunk lines and feeder lines” of colonial development.⁴⁰

In the remainder of this chapter, the presentation of our argument regarding Spanish-Mesoamerican patterns of conquest will cover four topics: alliances, sequential conquests (or the stepping-stone pattern), trade routes, and lordships and land grants.

Alliances

Colonial coercion was rooted in a system of administration and rule that depended upon the collaboration of local elites. A popular theme since the sixteenth century has been the supposed reputation of the Spaniards as invincible warriors, even gods—but conquest-era evidence suggests that this was a postconquest myth, that tales of apotheosized invaders were apocryphal.⁴¹ The real story lies in how local elites drew on Mesoamerican traditions of alliance formation to deal with the Spanish invasion.

According to Ross Hassig, “multi-city alliances were composed of allied city-states or multi-city states drawn together by mutually perceived interests, including security from external military threats, and they could thus

be of considerable size." The members of such alliances were not centrally controlled, nor did they share "a common ethnic identity." But, being "less bound by geographical limitations," they essentially functioned as "special-purpose institutions, arising from perceived needs and persisting as long as needs were satisfied."⁴²

It is no coincidence that Hassig's description of preconquest political organization and imperial strategy—and opposition to it—in central Mexico could just as accurately apply to Spanish strategies in Mesoamerica after 1519. In that year, the so-called Fat Cacique of Cempoala responded to the arrival of Hernando Cortés and his men in his town by proposing an alliance with Tlaxcala, Huexotzingo, and other city-states for the purpose of conquering Tenochtitlan.⁴³ Throughout preconquest times, such multicity alliances were created both for defensive and aggressive purposes, evolving as political mechanisms fundamental to Mesoamerican city-state cultures.⁴⁴ The so-called Triple Alliance—a sort of confederation between Tenochtitlan, Texcoco, and Tlacopan—was developed and used by the Mexica as a conquest machine that served to incorporate much of Mesoamerica into their empire by the time of the Spanish invasion. The Triple Alliance had succeeded another confederation between Azcapotzalco, Culhuacan, and Coatlinchan, which in turn was preceded by the alliance of Culhuacan, Tula, and Otumba.⁴⁵ The founding ideology of such alliances was often a rallying cry against the tyrannical rule of the existing power; this was the case with the creation of the Triple Alliance and with the alliance proposed by the Fat Cacique a century later. This kind of appeal across political boundaries could also be used against Spanish interests, of course, and thus helps to explain hindrances to Spanish expansion in regions such as Yucatan as much as it helps explain success in other regions.

One important dimension to alliance building in Mesoamerica both before and during the Spanish invasion was the exchange of women for marriage.⁴⁶ The Mixteca codices, for example, feature complex genealogies showing how each ruling house was related to others through marital exchanges. Central Mexican sources like the *Crónica mexicayotl*, the *Anales de Cuauhtitlan*, and the writings of Diego Durán do not show lineages as long, but they do give the history of ruling houses and their intermarital relationships. The longer a relationship or alliance between two houses lasted, the more intermarriages would take place and, therefore, the stronger and closer the relationship would become. This pattern of intermarriage continued through the early colonial period.⁴⁷ It is exactly this pattern that we frequently see men-

tioned in the sources with respect to the Spaniards. Both in Cempoala and in Tlaxcala the Spaniards received daughters of the rulers to *hacer generaci3n*, “to make generations” or “to engender.”⁴⁸ The most famous case is probably that of Doña Isabel Moctezuma, daughter of Moctezuma Xocoyotl, who was married to three preconquest rulers—her uncle Altixcatzin, Cuitlahuac, and Cuauhtemoc (the latter two being emperors in Tenochtitlan during the Spanish-Mexica war). After the conquest, she was briefly part of Cortés’s household, giving birth to his daughter but never marrying him. She did, however, marry three other Spaniards in succession—Alonso de Grado, Pedro Gallego, and finally Juan Cano.⁴⁹ From the native perspective, male rulers—or in Doña Isabel’s case, a noblewoman, as we must surely recognize the agency of Doña Isabel herself in her marital history—sought to build permanent blood-based alliances with prominent Spaniards.

As illustrated by the Mixteca codices, this political system of alliance building was not just typical for central Mexico. Throughout the postclassic period (A.D. 1000–1521), lords in the Mixteca Alta continuously shifted and adjusted alliances, creating a complex and vibrant web of political ties. Between the mid-fourteenth century and 1450 many city-states from the Valley of Oaxaca and the Mixteca Alta constituted a confederacy, which was used to invade the Isthmus of Tehuantepec to control the trade route to Xoconosco and Coatzacoalco.⁵⁰ Coixtlahuaca was probably “confederated” with, among others, Cholula, Huexotzingo, and Tlaxcala.⁵¹ Once this alliance failed, it meant the incorporation of Coixtlahuaca into the Triple Alliance’s tributary empire.

When Cortés and his men met the so-called Fat Cacique—who offered them food and shelter and suggested the alliance against Moctezuma—the Spaniards were well disposed to listen carefully (as much as language barriers permitted) to the possibilities the Cempoala lord presented to them. During the preceding months, the Spaniards had frequently encountered deserted towns and villages or had suffered attacks from indigenous warriors that had injured many Spaniards and their horses.⁵² On top of this, they learned that the Cempoala polity, while keen to rebel against Moctezuma in alliance with Cortés, had a history of being repeatedly conquered by an empire of considerable size and strength (Cempoala was conquered for the first time by Moctezuma Ilhuicamina, who ruled 1440–68, and then again by both Axayacatl and Moctezuma Xocoyotl).⁵³

Even if we accept Díaz del Castillo’s claim that there was no clear agreement between Cortés and the Fat Cacique, from his own account it is clear

that Cempoala was the place where Cortés and his men became involved in Mesoamerican sociopolitical patterns often without knowing it themselves. For example, it was not Cortés but the lords and guides from Cempoala who decided that the road to Tenochtitlan had to go through Tlaxcala. Even after the Spaniards and their allies had been received as friends by Olintetl—who was ruler of Iztacamaxtitlan, subject to Moctezuma, and who advised the Spaniards to go through Cholula on their way to Tenochtitlan—Cortés still followed the advice of the Cempoala lords and continued on to Tlaxcala. Cholula was yet another subject city of the Mexica empire and probably a place where Cortés and his men would have found considerable, if not decisive, resistance. But Tlaxcala was potentially an ally against the powerful Triple Alliance. There is no direct evidence that this was the rationale behind the advice of the Cempoala ruler, but it is clear that neither Cortés alone nor his fellow Spanish captains made such decisions without relying heavily on the expertise and arguments presented by allied Mesoamerican lords—not just in the case of the march to Tenochtitlan, but throughout the Spanish campaigns in Mesoamerica from 1519 on.

Sequential Conquests

Again, Hassig's description of Nahua patterns provides us with a model that can be applied to Spanish activities in the sixteenth century. In the passage quoted earlier, Hassig describes the sequential strategy of Mexica expansion; like the Spaniards after that, the Mexica used each newly conquered location—including its resources and personnel—as a springboard for the next. Added to this technique were the strategies of exploiting "local antagonisms" and waging "campaigns of intimidation" in which communities were invited to capitulate peacefully but reminded at the same time of "the object lessons burning around them."⁵⁴ This stepping-stone pattern is so equally applicable to the Spanish-allied conquests in Mesoamerica that most of the phrases used by Hassig could be applied to the Spanish conquest unaltered.

One of the most obvious examples is, of course, that of Tlaxcala. Whereas the Tlaxcalteca are often depicted as voluntarily aligning themselves with the Spaniards, this was initially not the case. On three different occasions Cortés and his men were faced with fierce resistance from the largest army that Tlaxcala could field. Having opposed the Triple Alliance for decades, the Tlaxcalteca were not ready to simply surrender their independence to

these new invaders. Furthermore, whereas the Fat Cacique may have seen opportunities in an alliance with the Spaniards after they had been victorious in a couple of battles on the Gulf coast, the Tlaxcalteca were not especially impressed by the surrender of these relatively small polities. After all, along with Tenochtitlan and Texcoco, Tlaxcala was one of the largest and most powerful political entities in central Mexico. However, things had changed considerably after the three battles. Unable to beat the Spaniards, Tlaxcala was forced to consider an alliance with them. This failure to defeat the Spaniards was turned into a potential positive; it meant that the Spaniards might be able to help Tlaxcala beat the Mexica, thereby opening the door to Tlaxcalteca imperial expansion (an expansion, it turned out, that would take place with Tlaxcalteca warriors but with somewhat different imperial ramifications). And if the alliance proved to be unsuccessful or unworkable, Tlaxcala might still continue to oppose the Triple Alliance as before.

Although some Tlaxcalteca factions were ready to continue fighting against the Spaniards (and arguably, eventually they would have defeated them and forced the survivors back to the coast), an alliance was forged, and it became the turning point in the 1519–21 war. The Tlaxcalteca who had initially fought against the Spanish invaders now became part of a large army of Spanish-indigenous allies. As with the Cempoala before them, the Tlaxcalteca warriors were incorporated into this army but would continue to be semiautonomous sections. Each section had its own captain, its own banner, and its own internal organization and as such represented its own community or *barrio*. As discussed earlier (and in subsequent chapters in this volume), this pattern was repeated across Mesoamerica in the ensuing decades: after the fall of Tenochtitlan, Mexica soldiers took part in the campaigns to Guatemala and Honduras; other Nahua went to Yucatan, while those from Chiapas went as far as Cuzcatlan; in Guatemala itself we see that K'iche', Achi, and other Maya troops took part in the campaigns to Honduras and El Salvador; and so on.⁵⁵

One fascinating case, recorded in the sources from Tepexi de la Seda, illustrates the ordinary pattern but with the addition of some extraordinary details. Various lesser-ranked noblemen from towns all over the local region were in Tepexi to perform personal service to the *tlatoani* (hereditary ruler) and ritually recognize his lordship when news came that Cortés and his Spanish-allied forces were en route to conquer the region. The whole ceremony was suspended, and the occasion turned into a local summit to

discuss the impending invasion. The tlatoani of Tepexi, Don Gonzalo Matzatzin Moctezuma, decided not to fight the Spaniards and their allies but rather strike the deal discussed earlier. The noblemen of the subject towns, who had been gathered in Tepexi when this decision was made, took part in the subsequent campaign to southern Puebla and the Mixteca. The twist in the tale, however, is that they took part in the (allegedly) violent conquests of their own towns. In fact, the majority of the towns Matzatzin conquered were already paying tribute and personal service to him. Why, then, did he conquer them again? Was he tricking the Mexica? Or was he tricking the Spaniards? Although the Tepexi source cannot answer these questions definitively, we suggest that Matzatzin (or his father, Xochiztin or Tozancoztli) took part in the conquest of the Mixteca under Ahuizotl or Moctezuma Xocoyotl.⁵⁶ In return for this participation, he had received the right to tribute and personal service from some of the neighborhoods, or *parcialidades*, in the Mixteca and Chochona towns. The bulk of the tribute, of course, would have gone to the Triple Alliance. Then, in 1520, with the arrival of the Spaniards, Matzatzin saw the opportunity to improve this settlement by reconquering, or perhaps conquering, the towns that were subject to the Triple Alliance, allowing him to receive all their tribute, rather than just a part of it. The trick, therefore, was played against both the Mexica (specifically his grandfather, Moctezuma) and the Spaniards—an impressive manipulation of the complex power politics of early-sixteenth-century Mesoamerica.

Furthermore, we should not forget the ambivalent nature of alliances and the possibilities for historiographical manipulation. After a peaceful agreement is reached, both sides can claim victory because nobody is clearly conquered. We see this in the Tlaxcalteca-Spanish alliance, but it clearly occurred in preconquest times too. According to a number of Mexica sources, Tehuantepec was conquered by Ahuizotl, but sources are divided on whether Tehuantepec paid tribute or not. A subsequent marriage between Cocijoeza, the Zapoteca ruler of Tehuantepec, and a daughter of Moctezuma Xocoyotl sealed the peace between these two kingdoms. Oaxacan sources, however, emphasize that Cocijoeza and Moctezuma fought a long exhaustive battle, which the latter ended with a peace proposal that was sealed by this marriage. Obviously, these Oaxacan sources deny that the Zapoteca were obliged to pay tribute to Tenochtitlan. In short, an agreement between two lords was interpreted in two different ways by their respective historians, each giving the benefit of the doubt to their own group.⁵⁷

Thus, although the Mesoamerican stepping-stone pattern of sequential conquests was most obviously used by Cortés and his fellow captains both against the Mexica and in the post-1521 campaigns, there were other preconquest patterns behind this one—as suggested by Matzatzin initiating a military campaign in the name of the king of Spain against his own subject towns. These other patterns or mechanisms of conquest were related to that of sequential conquests and likewise persisted during the sixteenth century.

Trade Routes

When the Spaniards arrived in Mesoamerica, this culture area consisted of a multitude of city-states interconnected through a complex web of social, political, and economic relationships. In the late postclassic period (1200–1521) this expressed itself in what is known as the Mixteca-Puebla style or the postclassic international style.⁵⁸ This style developed as a result of centuries of continuous exchange of information and material between the Mesoamerican city-states. According to Michael E. Smith and Frances Berdan, these city-states can be divided into different, partly overlapping, zones: the core zones, the affluent production zones, and the resource-extraction zones.⁵⁹ Trade, gift exchange, and tribute payments took place both within and between these zones.


Considering that during their military campaigns the Spaniards were to a large extent led by local lords and guides, we can presume that they followed existing routes. Logically, the routes of conquest would consequently follow the prehispanic trade routes. A simple comparison of the zones proposed by Smith and Berdan with the routes of the early conquest expeditions reveals that this was indeed what happened, as illustrated by map 2. The circles are Smith and Berdan's "Affluent Production and Resource-Extraction Zones"; the lines are the various early campaigns of conquests, from 1521 to 1545. The campaigns in the near north and west were (from north to south) by Nuño de Guzmán (1529–36), Francisco Cortés de Buenaventura (1524), and Cristóbal de Olid (1522). Into Oaxaca, Xoconosco, and Guatemala went Francisco Orozco (1521), Luis Marín (1521–24), and Pedro de Alvarado (1523), while Gonzalo de Sandoval invaded Coatzacoalco (1521). In the Yucatan peninsula, there were three Montejo campaigns—those led by Francisco de Montejo the elder in 1527–29 and 1529–35 and that led by his son in 1535–45. The correlation between

the two patterns is striking, albeit approximate. Nor does it include every trade route or related zone or the route of every expedition. For example, Cortés and Díaz del Castillo tell us that Pedro de Alvarado went to Tututepec, Oaxaca, to put down a rebellion without giving us any information about the route he took. The same is true for Zacatula, which was a known tributary city-state of the Triple Alliance, but no information exists about how this tribute got to central Mexico.⁶⁰

However, some of the trade routes are well documented. The route from Tenochtitlan to Guatemala is one of them; it passed through Chalco, Cholula, Izucar, Acatlan, Huajuapán, Coixtlahuaca, Nochixtlan, Huajolotitlan, Zaachila/Cuilapan, Tlacolula, Mitla, Nexapa, Tehuantepec, Tonalá, Xoconusco, Zapotitlan, Quetzaltenango, and the Guatemalan highlands. Of course, there were alternative paths at several points along the way. For example, after Cholula one could go to Tecamachalco, Tehuacan, Teotitlan, and Cuicatlan to hook up again in Huajolotitlan. Or if one wanted to avoid Cholula the route would pass through Amecameca and Cuautla before arriving in Izucar. Furthermore, at several points one could take routes to other places. Teotitlan was an important crossroads toward Tuxtepec via Huauhtla in the Mazatec mountains. In Tlacolula there was a path north through the Sierra Zapoteca connecting again with Tuxtepec, or one could go a bit further to Mitla and turn north to Coatzacoalco. Alternatively, one could go to Coatzacoalco via Tehuantepec. From Coatzacoalco the route goes to Xicalango and Tixchel from where the Yucatan Peninsula can be crossed to Caye Coco and Santa Rita in northern Belize. Or one could continue along the coast via Champoton to the city-states of northern Yucatan like Mayapan or Chikinchel.⁶¹

Comparing the trade route to Guatemala with that followed by the conquistadors it becomes clear that they are indeed the same. The last part of the route is confirmed both by Díaz del Castillo and López de Gómara in their descriptions of the 1523 campaign of Pedro de Alvarado to Guatemala; it went through Tehuantepec, Xoconusco, Zapotitlan, Quetzaltenango, Utatlan.⁶² Although no historical sources exist that confirm the exact route of the conquistadors from the Valley of Oaxaca to the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, the only practical way is through the Nexapa Valley. Furthermore, in the Valley of Oaxaca itself there is hardly any alternative between Huajolotitlan and Mitla.


Finally, the route of the conquistadors through Puebla and the Mixteca is amply demonstrated in the document by Don Joachin Moctezuma of



Map 2. The correlation between preconquest trade routes and conquest expedition routes

Tepexi de la Seda; almost certainly, the Spaniards later used the very same routes that were "pacified" by Don Gonzalo Matzatzin Moctezuma. According to the *interrogatorio* and related testimonies, Matzatzin's campaign can be divided into two parts: first his army went southwest of Tepexi, conquering until it reached the Valley of Oaxaca; then it turned back north conquering more towns. The towns of the first part are somewhat confusing, as there does not seem to be a clear pattern in their distribution: Chinantla, Igualtepec, Tlachinola, Acatlan, Ecatepec, and Huajolotitlan.⁶³ Apart from Acatlan and Huajolotitlan, the motivation for the conquest of these towns seems to be related to the control over centers of extraction of raw materials since they are not situated on any particular trade route. However, Tlachinola was the headtown of a gold-producing province, while Igualtepec, Acatlan, and Chinantla were salt-producing centers.⁶⁴ Although the witnesses seem to say that Huajolotitlan is the town of that name situated at the entrance of the Valley of Oaxaca, the context of the other conquests make clear that this is simply impossible. At no time did the army of Matzatzin reach that far south, and it is therefore at this time not clear how to explain these claims. The identification of the town as Huajolotitlan in the state of Puebla is strengthened if we consider the subsequent conquests of Chila, Teotitlan, Te[qui]cistepec, Tecomauacan, Acatepec, Quiotepec, Zapotitlan, Cuicatlan, Tehuacan, Coixtlahuaca, Chiapulco, Texupan, Coxcatlan, Tamazulapa, and Teposcolula.

It is immediately clear from the layout of these towns (see map 3) that Matzatzin was taking over the two main trade routes between the Valley of Mexico and southern Mesoamerica. Furthermore, he secured the crossroads to Tuxtepec and the Mixteca coast when he took Teotitlan and Teposcolula. Whereas at first his conquests appear to be an opportunistic attempt to gain more power, this analysis of the geography of his expedition shows that Matzatzin was orchestrating a calculated military campaign to control one of the economic lifelines of Mesoamerica and an important resource-extraction zone. The conquests show the existence and importance of trade routes connecting central Mexico to the Gulf coast, from where Yucatan could be reached, or to the Oaxaca region, which leads to Xoconosco and Guatemala. In taking over southern Puebla and the Mixteca, Matzatzin not only enriched and empowered himself but also paved the way for later Spanish intrusions into the Valley of Oaxaca, the Tututepec province, and southern Mesoamerica. This explains why none of the conquistadors or chroniclers mention any military conquest in these two particular regions;



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Map 3. The correlation between trade routes and Matzatzin of Tepexi's conquest routes of 1520

Matzatzin had already effectively incorporated these towns into what was becoming New Spain.⁶⁵ Further examples could be added, and indeed one has already been implied with the discussion of the Cortés-led expedition to Honduras in 1525–26, which clearly traveled for most of the way along existing paths. Some of these paths, such as the route through the Chontal Maya capital of Itzamkanac and into the Itza Maya kingdom may have been many centuries old, possibly those also used by expeditions from classic period Teotihuacan to Tikal (located within sixteenth-century Itza borders, just north of the capital, Tah Itza or Tayasal).⁶⁶

Lordships and Land Grants

One of the intriguing aspects of the conquest period is the question of motivation. What motivated indigenous troops to participate in the Spanish undertaking? The most common explanation has been the wish to free themselves from the Mexica military and tributary control, but this can explain only part of the story. As detailed earlier, indigenous participation did not stop after the destruction of Tenochtitlan but continued for many decades; as the conquest continuously developed and changed, the motives for native participation must have developed and changed with it. Of course, right from the start the Fat Cacique complained about the tribute and service he had to give to Moctezuma and the people he had to hand over for sacrifice to the Mexica gods. But it is curious that when Cortés ordered a campaign against neighboring Tizapancingo, Cempoala brought together a large army of two thousand soldiers to accompany the Spanish troops. According to the Fat Cacique Tizapancingo was full of Mexica warriors who were destroying Cempoala's fields and subject towns as well as assaulting its people. However, when Cortés's army and their newly found allies arrived in Tizapancingo it turned out that the Fat Cacique was using the Spaniards to settle old debts with their neighbor.⁶⁷ This example is a cautionary tale, suggesting that there were various levels of decision making at different moments, based on different kind of motives.

The motives for participation by native groups often seem to have been opportunistic and short-term. What, therefore, did local rulers imagine would happen in the long run? This is a difficult question to answer since we lack indigenous sources from the 1520s that could illuminate such expectations.⁶⁸ We can, however, determine preconquest practice in relation to conquest and its aftermath, and we can analyze the letters of indige-

nous rulers to the emperor or the Audiencia, mentioned earlier, as the claims that they make and the frustrations they express may be considered to be indications of unfulfilled expectations. Of course, these letters might be viewed as inflated reports by indigenous groups who knew how to manipulate the Spanish legal system. But if we can show a continuity of conquest practices from preconquest to early colonial decades and show that the claims these indigenous conquistadors made were actually based on this practice, then we must accept that such letters were more than mere manipulations and exaggerations.

A typical aspect of conquest practice prior to the Spanish invasion was the division of land by a warlord, a religious leader, or a supreme ruler among his captains. These captains were probably leaders of cohesive groups based on some kind of relationship (consanguinity, ethnicity, geography, etc.). A clear example of this pattern is described by the central Mexican chronicler Ixtlilxochitl in relation to the early Nahua conquests by Xolotl. Having sent his four captains in the four cardinal directions to seize the territory, Xolotl then divided it among his lords and assigned people to serve them.⁶⁹

But in other regions too, like the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, we find further examples. We know that around A.D. 1375 Cosijoeza I founded various villages as strongholds along the trade route to Xoconosco.⁷⁰ In the mid-fifteenth century these foundations were followed by a large-scale military invasion and migration in which Cocijopii led forces to the isthmus. New towns were established, and the warlords received the Title of Pichana, or Xoana—comparable to the central Mexican Title of Teuctli. From that moment on, these Xoanas periodically had to pledge loyalty to their lord, who in return gave them recognition. The *lienzos* of Guevea, Santo Domingo Petapa, and Huilotepec contain representations of ceremonies in which the authorities of these villages received the Titles of Xoana, based on the simple fact that their ancestors had been captains in the conquest of the region, following which events the supreme lord and leader of the campaign had divided the land among these captains. In other words, the ritual is a reenactment of conquest.

The division of land in return for military support is a well-known Mesoamerican theme, as shown in the "contract" the Tolteca-Chichimeca made with the Chichimeca in order to defeat the allied lords of Cholula. Once the Tolteca-Chichimeca won the war, they gave these mercenaries the title of *teuhctli*, as well as land and people to work it.⁷¹ But we can find

examples in just about any central Mexican source.⁷² This very same phenomenon took place years later when various city-states supported the Spanish conquistadors. In 1571 various indigenous groups living in Guatemala but originally from central Mexico, Puebla, and Oaxaca claimed from the Spanish Crown the right to land and tribute based on the participation of their ancestors in the conquest of the region.⁷³

Similar claims were put forward by the authorities of Tlaxcala, who on several occasions made clear that Cortés had made a verbal promise to reward the city with a land grant in return for their help in the conquest.⁷⁴ Whether true or not, the promise was used as a means to claim privileges and rights and as such fits perfectly within the Mesoamerican scheme of participation in conquest and alliance.

Of course, the Spaniards also claimed similar rights and privileges from the Crown as a reward for their part in the conquest, and as such they also followed an old tradition which goes back into the Middle Ages. However, the existence of this Spanish tradition does not explain indigenous Mesoamerican participation in the conquest. It is evident that indigenous troops took part in the Spanish-allied conquest because they took for granted that they would receive what until then was usually granted after such campaigns. But, when the Spaniards did not respond in the same way as the preconquest lords used to do, indigenous nobles began submitting judicial claims. These petitions reveal a growing desperation as the early colonial period wore on. Eventually, these kinds of claims by indigenous nobles and their descendants faded away as they became aware that the system no longer worked in the same way. Preconquest society had changed into colonial society.

CONCLUSION

The discovery of increasing numbers of documents detailing the extensive roles of indigenous allies in the Spanish conquest has made a reevaluation of the conquest period necessary. Whereas our view of this period was and still is based on sources produced within the European historiographical tradition, these recently emerged sources make it clear that an indigenous historiographical tradition existed too (albeit one recorded and preserved within the formats of the colonial system). The views expressed in the native tradition are often diametrically opposed to the claims of the

Spanish one. Whereas Spanish historical sources portray the conquest of Mesoamerica as a controlled and conscious military campaign led by heroes like Hernando Cortés and Pedro de Alvarado, the indigenous sources describe a far more complex process of alliances and negotiations among various groups. Moreover, the conquest is described as a continuation of precolonial processes of conquest and domination.

In order to reach a balanced view on the conquest period it will be necessary to reconstruct and study the indigenous historiographical tradition thoroughly and as a whole. That is, we need to consider this corpus of documents as independent from those of the European tradition before we can begin an analysis and comparison of the two traditions.⁷⁵

This chapter contributes to the initial stage of this complicated process of reconstructing the indigenous historiographical tradition on the conquest of Mesoamerica. We have offered a preliminary discussion of some of the sources through the creation of four categories of analysis. The first two categories or topics—on “friendly Indian” numbers and the role of indigenous allies after the fall of the Mexica empire—presented an indigenous vision of the conquest of Mesoamerica as a series of events decided and determined by the many indigenous troops and “captains” that made it possible. Although Spanish captains were often in primary leadership positions, this was not always the case, as demonstrated by the conquests of Don Gonzalo Matzatzin Moctezuma of Tepexi de la Seda. The third category detailed nonmilitary participation in the conquest by natives in ways that are less obvious but often just as decisive. In other words, noncombatant indigenous participation—from spies to interpreters and from porters to cooks—was as important as combatant participation. More surprising, however, was the importance of the continuation of precolonial patterns and mechanisms during the conquest period. This fourth analytical category argued that there was a correspondence between prehispanic trade routes and conquest routes and that motivations for conquest participation and the maintenance of multicity alliances were both continuations of precolonial practices and patterns.

All this suggests that there is another story to be told, one that we will eventually be able to tell in considerable detail. We know the half that was written by the Spanish conquistadors and their compatriots, but there is still another half that needs to be unlocked—the other side of the conquest of Mesoamerica.

NOTES

1. The unsigned paintings, formerly known as the Strickland series, were acquired by the Jay I. Kislak Foundation in 1999 and were loaned in 2003 to the University of Miami's Lowe Art Museum; see the catalog for the exhibit, Jackson and Brienen, *Visions of Empire*. They are now housed at the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. The series is oil on canvas, and the seventh painting is 48 x 78 inches. The second painting is reproduced and discussed briefly in Restall, *Seven Myths*, 30–31.

2. For examples, see Restall, *Seven Myths*, 3.

3. Restall, *Seven Myths*, 140–44.

4. Partly for this reason, the discussion of native allies is presented in *Seven Myths* (44–63) in the larger context of the assistance that Spaniards received both from native and African soldiers; on the latter, also see Restall, "Black Conquistadors."

5. Alvarado, *Account of the Conquest*, 80. An example of evidence of such allies outside Alvarado's own reports is the proceedings surrounding the 1564 petition by the descendants of such allies for tribute exemption, in Archivo General de Indias, Seville (hereafter, AGI), Justicia 291, 1.

6. "Al tiempo que el d[ic]ho don pedro de alvarado passo con los d[ic]hos españoles e yndios capitanes de suso declarados vido que trayan consigo muchos yndios de sus tierras que dezian que heran sus deudos e maçeguales y quel t[iem]po que este testigo anduvo en la guerra vido que los d[ic]hos capitanes hizieron su cuadrillas cada uno por su orden." AGI Justicia 291, 1, f. 96v.

7. See Hassig, *Aztec Warfare*, 56.

8. Díaz del Castillo, *Historia verdadera*, chaps. 81 and 150; Cortés, *Letters from Mexico*, 211.

9. See Restall, *Seven Myths*, 11–18, 37, for further discussion of the probanza genre and its role in the development of "myths" of the conquest. Examples of probanzas by black conquistadors are in AGI México 204 and 2999, 2. Also see Restall, *Seven Myths*, 54–63.

10. See Restall, "Heirs to the Hieroglyphs," 239–67.

11. See Restall, *Maya Conquistador*; Wood, *Transcending Conquest*; Sousa and Terraciano, "Original Conquest."

12. AGI Patronato 245; AGI Guatemala 52, ff. 77r–78r; AGI México 94, 9; AGI Escribanía 160b, 1, f. 285r; AGI Justicia 291, 1, f. 239r. On the campaign of Jorge de Alvarado, see Asselbergs, chapter 2, and Herrera, chapter 4, this volume; also see Asselbergs, *Conquered Conquistadors*.

13. AGI Justicia, 291, 1, f. 88v; AGI Patronato 184, 50, published in Pérez-Rocha and Tena, *La nobleza indígena*, 281–86. Some of these conquistadors not coming back to their original communities may also be due to settlement in the conquered regions rather than death in battle. (We thank the referent for this suggestion.)

14. Don Joachin claimed that his grandfather, Don Gonzalo, was a grandson of Moctezuma Xocoyotl through his mother, Doña Maria, who supposedly was a

daughter of the Mexica ruler. For historical and chronological reasons it seems more likely that Don Gonzalo was a great-grandson of Moctezuma Ilhuicamina (1440–68) as is confirmed information from Alvarado Tezozomoc, *Crónica mexicayotl*, 200; Chimalpahin Quauhtlehuanitzin, *Codex Chimalpahin*, 1:132–33; and several witnesses (AGI Patronato 245, R. 10:4v, 12r, 14r, 17r, 19v). Klaus Jäcklein accepted Don Joachin's claim that his grandfather was a grandson of Moctezuma Xocoyotl. *Los popolocas de Tepexi*.

15. E.g., see the competing Mixteca and Nahua accounts from the Valley of Oaxaca (Sousa and Terraciano, "Original Conquest") and the creative borrowing that may have contributed to the narrative in the Mapa de Cuauhtlantzinco (Wood, *Transcending Conquest*, 77–106).

16. For a discussion of the concept of conquest in Mesoamerica, see Oudijk, "La Toma de Posesión." See also Acuña, *Relaciones geográficas*, plates 60–66.

17. AGI México 110.

18. See Berdan et al., *Aztec Imperial Strategies*; Berdan and Anawalt, *Essential Codex Mendoza*, 102–103.

19. "Por buenas palabras a lagunas y a otros por guerra." AGI Patronato 245, R. 10, ff. 10r.

20. Cieza de León, *Discovery and Conquest*, 295, 302.

21. AGI México 274, 1, f. 10r (1624); no n., f. 1r (1630).

22. For more details and examples of Mesoamericans and other native soldiers serving as militiamen in the Spanish colonies, particularly in Mexico after about 1550, see the sections "The Role of Native Militias" and "Native Militiamen on the Frontier: Sonora in the 1790s" in Vinson and Restall, "Black Soldiers, Native Soldiers," 15–52.

23. On the Military Revolution, see Parker, *Military Revolution*; on its relevance to the Spanish conquest and misperceptions of it, see Restall, *Seven Myths*, 28–33, 143.

24. "Desde que vimos tant indio de carga nos holgamos, porque antes siempre traíamos a cuestas nuestras mochilas." Díaz del Castillo, *Historia verdadera*, chap. 45.

25. See Asselbergs, chapter 2, and Yannakakis, chapter 7, this volume.

26. AGI Justicia 291, 1, ff. 63r, 89r, 94r, 113v–114r, 124r.

27. Díaz del Castillo, *Historia verdadera*, chaps. 44, 45, 51, and 68.

28. AGI Guatemala 52, ff. 77r–78r (1547); AGI Patronato 2, 2; AGI Justicia 291, 1, ff. 69v, 97r, 171r–v, 174r; AGI Escribanía 160b, ff. 186–89; Muñoz Camargo, *Historia de Tlaxcala* (ed. Vasquez), book 2, chap. 4: 194–209.

29. The complete título is published in translation in Restall, *Maya Conquistador*, 86–103, quote on 87.

30. "Porque los naturales rrebeldes avian alçado los bastimentos e los escondian y no hallavan de comer." AGI Justicia 291, 1, f. 149r.

31. "Y vido que padescieron muchos trabajos de hambre." AGI Justicia 291, 1, f. 93v and further.

32. Restall, *Seven Myths*, 149. The chief source on this raid is Díaz del Castillo; see *Historia verdadera*, f. 200r of the original 1632 edition (copy in John Carter Brown Library [JCBL], Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island).

33. "Yvan siempre delante descubriendo tierra e sino fuera por hellos pereçieran muchas vezes porque los yndios henemygos les thenyan puestas çeladas y muchos hoyos hechos donde el que caya no podia escapar lo qual descubrian los d[ic]hos yndios." AGI Justicia 291, 1, f. 98r. The Lienzo de Quauhquechollan seems to portray a variant of these pits; see Asselberg, "La conquista de Guatemala."

34. See, e.g., AGI Justicia 291, 1, ff. 39v, 76r, 82v, 106v.

35. The Chontal Maya text, the Title of Acalan-Tixchel, ff. 72v-73r, translated in Restall, *Maya Conquistador*, 64.

36. Díaz del Castillo, *Historia verdadera*, chap. 62.

37. AGI Justicia 291, 1, f. 17r.

38. Karttunen, "Interpreters," 215. On Chi, Malinche, and other native interpreters, see Karttunen, *Between Worlds*; Restall, *Maya Conquistador*, 144-52; Restall, "Gaspar Antonio Chi"; and Restall, *Seven Myths*, 23-24, 82-88, 91, 93.

39. Restall, *Seven Myths*, 18-26.

40. Presented variously by Lockhart; see, e.g., "Trunk Lines and Feeder Lines."

41. Restall, *Seven Myths*, 108-20. With respect to central Mexico, this misconception or myth was based largely on the use of the Nahuatl term *teotl* as a reference to the Spanish invaders. Díaz del Castillo explained that the term related to "the idols, or their gods, or bad things." *Historia verdadera*, chap. 61, esp. p. 104 (ed. Ramírez Cabañas). Nahua were probably referring to the latter of these semantically related concepts when they called the Spaniards *teules*. The apparently contradictory nature of these concepts is rooted in the Mesoamerican belief system and the characteristic of sacred entities as being loaded with *mana* (power). (See López Austin, *Los mitos del Tlacuache*, chaps. 10-12, for a discussion of the nature of Mesoamerican gods.) That the Nahua meant "bad things" rather than simply "gods" is confirmed by one of Cortés's actions early on in the conquest. In order to impress the Mexica garrison in Tizapancingo he sent out Heredia "El Viejo," a conquistador with "a nasty look in his face, a long beard, his face partly slashed away, blind in one eye, and limping with one leg" ("tenía mala catadura en la cara, y la barba grande y la cara medio acuchillada, y un ojo tuerto, y cojo de una pierna"). Díaz del Castillo, *Historia verdadera* (ed. Ramírez Cabañas), 83. Furthermore, Cortés told him to shoot his rifle like a madman. That these tactics worked is clear from some descriptions in indigenous sources expressing an awe and fearful respect for certain Spaniards; see, e.g., the second page of Lima, *Libro*, or see the descriptions in AGI Patronato 245, R. 10. However, this did not keep Mesoamerican soldiers from fighting and killing the Spaniards or their horses. On the contrary, Spaniards may have been seen as the *ixiptlatli* of the *teteuh*; i.e., they were representatives or impersonators of the *teteuh* and as such had to be treated with respect but could be killed. In fact, in Mesoamerican ritual life the role of the *ixiptlatli* is to be killed, as various sources attest; Hvidtfeldt, *Teotl and Ixiptlatli*, on the concept of *ixiptlatli* and particularly Sahagún, *Historia general*, on Mexica rituals. The issue of the

Spaniards as *teteuh* (or *ixiptlatli*) strongly suggests that both sides were looking for meeting points or familiar features in the other's culture, seeking to bring these together to form a basis on which they could communicate and work together—the beginnings of syncretism. See Oudijk, "La Toma de Posesión," 95–131, esp. note 8 for a discussion of the process of syncretism and Mesoamerican colonial traditions.

42. Hassig, *Aztec Warfare*, 23.

43. López de Gómara, *La conquista de México*, 104–107. Note that Díaz del Castillo denies that such an alliance was proposed at this stage: "Aquí es donde dice el coronista [*sic*] Gómara que estuvo Cortés muchos días en Cempoal, y que se concertó la rebelión y liga contra Montezuma: no le informaron bien, porque, como he dicho, otro día por la mañana salimos de allí." *Historia verdadera* (ed. Ramírez Cabañas), 77. According to Díaz del Castillo, the rebellion against Moctezuma began at the instigation of Cortés, when the Spanish leader pressed Cempoala into taking Moctezuma's tribute collectors prisoner and refusing to pay tribute to anyone but the king of Spain. *Ibid.*, 79–81.

44. Hansen, *Thirty City-State Cultures*, and Hansen, *Six City-State Cultures*. See these two volumes for contributions on the Maya, Mixteca, Mexica, and Zapoteca city-state cultures by Nikolai Grube, Michael Lind, Michael Smith, and Michel R. Oudijk, respectively.

45. Chimalpain Quauhtlehuanitzin, *Memorial Breve*, chaps. 7 and 15.

46. See Herrera, chapter 4, this volume, for further discussion of this mechanism during the conquest.

47. Oudijk, *Historiography*; Pérez-Rocha and Tena, *La nobleza indígena*; S. Gillespie, *Aztec Kings*.

48. See Díaz del Castillo, *Historia verdadera*, chaps. 51 and 76. "Generation" is probably not meant to be understood as the relation from father to son but rather in the sense of lineage. Both in Nahuatl and Zapotec "lineage" and "generation" are one and the same word: *tlacamecayotl* and *tija*, respectively.

49. AGI México 762 (1629); see Pérez-Rocha and Tena, *La nobleza indígena*, and Pérez-Rocha, *Privilegios en lucha*, for a discussion of Doña Isabel and the transcription of some documents related to legal battles for privileges. Also see Chipman, *Moctezuma's Children*.

50. Oudijk, *Historiography*, and Oudijk, "Zapotec City-State."

51. Pohl, "Royal Marriage."

52. In Cozumel they found empty villages as the population had fled to the mountains. This meant the Spaniards ran out of food and water. At a village on the Rio Grijalva they received some food under threat of war. The next day a battle took place and they deserted their village, only to be followed by more days of battle. Cortés, *Cartas de relación*, first letter; Díaz del Castillo, *Historia verdadera*, chaps. 25–44.

53. Durán, *Historia de las indias*, chaps. 19–20; Alvarado Tezozomoc, *Crónica mexicana*, chaps. 49–50; Díaz del Castillo, *Historia verdadera*, chaps. 45–47. See also Hassig, *Aztec Warfare*, 328n48; Berdan et al., *Aztec Imperial Strategies*, 286–87.

54. Hassig, *Aztec Warfare*, 21.

55. AGI Justicia 291. The whole document shows this pattern but see particularly ff. 86r–91v, 118v, 127v, 131r–v, 148r; also see earlier AGI citations.

56. See Berdan and Anawalt, *Essential Codex Mendoza*, 22–25, for a discussion of the conquests by these Mexica rulers.

57. See Oudijk, *Historiography*, chap. 2, for a full discussion. But even conquests are ambivalent as different kinds occur: “e que alg[un]os dellos ffueron conquistados y allanados por fuerça de armas y otros por rruegos y amonestaçiones.” AGI Patronato, 245, R. 10, f. 294. See Oudijk, “La toma de posesión,” for a discussion of the concept of conquest in Mesoamerica.

58. Nicholson and Quiñones Keber, *Mixteca Puebla*; Smith and Berdan, *Postclassic Mesoamerican World*.

59. Smith and Berdan, “Spatial Structure.”

60. See Berdan et al., *Aztec Imperial Strategies*, 277–78.

61. Lee and Navarrete, *Mesoamerican Communication Routes*; Smith and Berdan, *Postclassic Mesoamerican World*, chaps. 22, 31, 33–35; Gutiérrez Mendoza et al., “Least Cost Path Analysis”; Oudijk, *Historiography*, chap. 2.

62. López de Gómara, *La conquista de México*, 338–41; Díaz del Castillo, *Historia verdadera*, chap. 164.

63. Chinantla is a bit confusing, as it is normally associated with the Chinantec region in northern Oaxaca. However, within this context it seems to be referring to the name of the town right next to the important town of Piaztla. See Gerhard, *Geografía histórica*, 44. A similar thing can be said of Tlachinola, which is or became a barrio of Tlapa and is sometimes even used an alternative name for Tlapa. Ibid., 333; Carrasco, *Tenochca Empire*, 276–79. We have not been able to identify the town of Ecatepec. See also Jäcklein, *Los popolocas de Tepexi*, for an identification of these towns.

64. See Berdan and Anawalt, *Essential Codex Mendoza*, ff. 39r, for the Tlapa province and Berdan et al., *Aztec Imperial Strategies*, 273, 284, for a discussion of those of Chiauhltlan and Acatlan.

65. When the Spaniards were in Tepeaca after the so-called Noche Triste, Cortés received ambassadors from Coixtlahuaca and eight other towns of that region who promised loyalty to the king of Spain. Cortés, *Cartas de relación*, 94; López de Gómara, *La conquista de México*, 263–64.

66. Restall, *Maya Conquistador*, 62–65; Izquierdo, *Acalán y la Chontalpa*; Piña Chan, “Commerce.”

67. Díaz del Castillo, *Historia verdadera*, chaps. 49 and 51.

68. See Gruzinski, *Conquest of Mexico*, for an analysis of the adaptations and changes of the indigenous cosmovision and psyche as a consequence of the arrival of the Spaniards and the establishment of colonial society.

69. Fernando de Alva Ixtlilxochitl, *Obras históricas*, 1:296.

70. AGI Escribanía de Cámara 160b; Oudijk, *Historiography*, 2000.


71. See Kirchhoff, Odena Güemes, and Reyes García, *Historia tolteca-chichimeca*, 158–87, 161–282.

72. See, e.g., Durán, *Historia de las indias*, 129–30; Ixtlilxochitl, *Obras históricas*, 1:295–96.

73. AGI Justicia 291, f. 505v.

74. AGI Mexico 94, exp. 33.

75. This is a similar methodological challenge to that faced by historical archaeology; in the words of Michael E. Smith, “the archaeological and ethnohistorical records should be analyzed independently to yield their own separate conclusions before correlation is attempted. When the two records are compared, one should not confuse any resulting composite models with the independent primary data sets.” “Expansion of the Aztec Empire,” 88. Also see Charlton, “Archaeology, Ethnohistory, and Ethnology”; Trigger, *History*; Malina and Vasicek, *Archaeology Yesterday and Today*; Small, *Methods in the Mediterranean*; Andrén, *Between Artifacts and Texts*; Moreland, *Archaeology and Text*.



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Map 4. Conquest expeditions in Central America